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Our piece, “Art by Jerks,” proved timely in two ways. Soon after
its publication several celebrity scandals shook the
entertainment industry–those involving Weinstein, Spacey, and
C.K.–giving it a veneer of prescience.[1] It also thus served as a
suitable foil for Christopher Bartel’s “Ordinary Monsters,” in
which he furthers the debate about the ethical criticism of art.[2]
Grateful as we are for the critique, we respond here to clarify
and defend certain aspects of our view.
Bartel labels our view of the relationship between aesthetic and
moral values “independence-with-exceptions,” calling it intuitive
though “obviously untenable,” since “it is puzzling how one can
maintain both independence as well as exceptions” (§3). Ours,
however, is a threshold view. We posit a threshold of moral
signi cance below which an artist’s moral misdemeanors should
not matter in evaluating their art but above which their moral
crimes may indeed matter. This is no less principled than the
concept of a boiling point. Likewise, there is no inherent
problem with the notion of exceptionable principles, as with
ceteris paribus scienti c laws. Bartel seems to acknowledge at
least the former point, with the idea that we set the bar too high
in allowing that “some artists can be held accountable for their
private moral failings” (§3).
Squaring such theory with actual practice, in most encounters
with art we presume innocence and judge a work on its own
merits. We are not necessarily remiss for doing so without
conducting a background check on the artist to ascertain
whether their work merits attention, which would be motivated
by the assumption that the work’s aesthetic interest may be
compromised by the artist’s private life. Where such information
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is available, of course, it may and sometimes should a ect our
assessment of the work. In general, however, it would be
excessive or simply absurd to subject every artist to vigorous
biographical vetting. We resist a too-sensitive ethicism that
would either deduct aesthetic worth because of minor moral
aws or automatically grant a measure of it to nice people’s art.
Not all ethical aws have aesthetic implications. At any rate, one
of us has a background in Classics; we do not know very much,
empirically, about Sophocles, and, even worse, many works
from this period are anonymous. Is our evaluation of them
necessarily incomplete because we have little to no biographical
information on the people who created them? Though there is
room for debate here, it is in large part a modern prejudice that
braids the artwork closely with the artist, a prejudice not shared
by Gothic artisans, who virtually never thought to sign their
work, or postmodern “death of the author” theorists, for whom
the text, like Frankenstein’s monster, escapes the control of its
putative creator. We concede, though, that if we know the artist
is a monster, there may be cases where we should take this into
account.
Bartel also claims that above our threshold such “exceptions
apply only to ‘extreme cases'” (§3, added emphasis)–that is, the
extraordinary monsters, the psychopaths, contrasting with his
own ordinary monsters. This is a misimpression. We also admit
other exceptions: (1) where immoral attitudes are not just
depicted in but clearly endorsed by a work, for example, Gaut’s
cases, which Bartel is not interested in (§1), though we are; (2)
where a viewer is understandably overwhelmed by morally
appropriate responses to the artist (§2, 4). Being unable or
unwilling to encounter such work with complete detachment
may be permissible even where others may also appreciate it no
less permissibly, not ignoring but bracketing such moral
response to the artist. Our leanings here are pluralistic. As we
point out, concerning fascist authors like Pound or Hamsun (§45), one may justi ably either nd or fail to nd the work thereby
diminished.
The case of Bill Cosby adduced by Bartel (§1) is instructive–
though the monstrosity here could hardly be called ordinary–
since Cosby is a performer, where our examples were drawn
mostly from creative art, such as literature, lm, sculpture, and
the like, where we expect a clear separation between creator
and the created work. But with the performances of actors and
comedians, it both is and ought to be harder to separate one’s
response to the artist from one’s response to the work, since we
must encounter the very person of the performer who realizes
the work. It’s Cosby himself on stage. Being repulsed by a
performer’s immoral acts in viewing their work thus becomes
more understandable and harder to overlook, though the
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reverse can be a problem, as when fans inexplicably blame
actors for the evil of the characters they play. If the bar drops
lower for performers than creators, that positions our view
closer to Bartel’s own than his critique of us suggests.
Jason Holt, Acadia University
jason.holt@acadiau.ca
Bernard Wills, Memorial University (Grenfell)
bwills@grenfell.mun.ca
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